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Abstract
If the human race comes to an end relatively shortly, then we have been born
at a fairly typical time in history of humanity. On the other hand, if humanity
lasts for much longer and trillions of people eventually exist, then we have
been born in the first surprisingly tiny fraction of all people. According to
the Doomsday Argument of Carter, Leslie, Gott, and Nielsen, this means that
the chance of a disaster which would obliterate humanity is much larger than
usually thought. Here I argue that treating possible observers in the same way
as those who actually exist avoids this conclusion. Under this treatment, it is
more likely to exist at all in a race which is long-lived, as originally discussed
by Dieks, and this cancels the Doomsday Argument, so that the chance of
a disaster is only what one would ordinarily estimate. Treating possible and
actual observers alike also allows sensible anthropic predictions from quantum
cosmology, which would otherwise depend on one’s interpretation of quantum
mechanics.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Doomsday Argument was introduced by Carter [1] and Leslie [2]1, and independently
in somewhat different form by Gott [4] and also by Nielsen [5]. The general argument in
the Carter-Leslie form runs as follows: There is some possibility that the human race will
last for a very long time and grow to huge numbers. In that case, we have been born in
the first tiny fraction of all humans, which would be very surprising. On the other hand,
there is also some possibility that the human race will die out before too long due to some
disaster (nuclear war, asteroid impact, etc.). In that case, we have been born roughly in
the middle of all humans. (About 10% of humans ever born are alive today, so even if the
human race were to end tomorrow, the average person alive today would just be in the last
10%.) This, claim Carter and Leslie, gives us reason to increase our estimates that the race
will end before too long, making us typical, rather than going on a very long time, making
us unusual.
The underlying idea is formalized by Bostrom [6] as the “Self-Sampling Assumption”:
Every observer should reason as if they were a random sample drawn from the
set of all observers.
This is essentially Vilenkin’s “principle of mediocrity” [7] applied to individual observers
rather than civilizations. To derive the doomsday conclusion, according to Leslie and
Bostrom, one proceeds as follows [6]. Something like 60 billion people have been born
so far. Suppose for simplicity that there are only two possibilities: Either the race will die
out soon, so that the total number of humans ever to be born is 200 billion, or it will last
much longer so that the total number is 200 trillion. We will call the hypotheses of a short-
or long-lived race S and L respectively. Suppose that before you take into account the
doomsday argument, you think that the chances of these two alternatives are Pprior(S) and
Pprior(L) = 1 − Pprior(S). Now you take into account the fact that you are the Nth human
to be born, with N ∼ 6 × 1010. The probabilities of S and L should be multiplied by the
chance that your birth rank would have been N in each case, which we will denote P (N |a),
where a ranges over S and L. Thus the chance of each alternative, taking into account N ,
is
P (a|N) ∝ P (N |a)Pprior(a) . (1)
Including the normalization factor, you find that the probability that the human race will
be short-lived is now
P (S|N) =
P (N |S)Pprior(S)
P (N |S)Pprior(S) + P (N |L)Pprior(L)
, (2)
which is just Bayes’s Rule. The chance to have a particular birth rank is inversely propor-
tional to the total number of humans to ever exist, so P (N |S) = 1000P (N |L) and
1Leslie has written extensively on this subject; his ideas are collected and summarized in [3]
2
P (S|N) =
Pprior(S)
Pprior(S) + 10−3Pprior(L)
(3)
Unless you started with Pprior(S) ∼ 10
−3 or less, you will find that the chance of a short-lived
race is nearly 1.
Gott [4] makes a similar claim about the length of time for which the human race will
exist, based on the “delta t argument”. If a phenomenon exists for certain period of time T ,
then we should expect ourselves to be observing it at a random time during its life. Thus, for
example, the chance that we see the phenomenon in the first or last 2.5% of its life is 0.05.
Gott argues from this that if we know the amount of time tpast for which the phenomenon
has existed, then we can conclude that there is a 95% chance that the total lifetime will be
such as to make
0.025T < tpast < 0.975T . (4)
We can rewrite this inequality in terms of tfuture = T − tpast,
tpast/39 < tfuture < 39tpast . (5)
Applying this to the human species, Gott uses tpast ≈ 200,000 years to conclude that there is
a 95% probability that the future lifetime of our species will be between 5,100 and 7.8× 106
years.
Many counterarguments can be raised against the doomsday argument, but I want to
concentrate here on a single one, as follows. In the scenario where the human race is very
long-lived and there are many humans altogether, there is a greater “chance to exist at all”
than in the scenario where the race is soon to die out. Thus our prior probability should
first be multiplied by the number of people in each scenario. We can write
P (a|I) ∝ Ntotal(a)Pprior(a) (6)
where Ntotal(a) is the total number of observers in case a, and P (a|I) is the probability of
case a given that I exist to observe it. Then
P (a|N) ∝ P (N |a)P (a|I) ∝ P (N |a)Ntotal(a)Pprior(a) ∝ Pprior(a) . (7)
Thus the increased chance of finding oneself in a long-lived race, because it contains more
observers, exactly cancels the decreased chance of finding oneself with a particular N in the
long-lived race. The chance of the race dying out quickly is thus the prior chance of such an
event, whatever one computes that to be based on one’s estimation of the various possible
disasters. The doomsday argument does not modify the conclusion.
The idea that one is more likely to find oneself in the long-lived race is called the Self-
Indication Assumption by Bostrom. It was first discussed by Dieks [8], and has since been
criticized by Leslie [3] and Bostrom [6] and defended by Kopf, Krtous and Page [9] and by
Bartha and Hitchcock [10]. I will give several arguments in favor and attempt to answer
Bostrom’s and Leslie’s objections. I will also analyze Gott’s argument specifically, and
address the issue of why, if it is wrong, it seems to have had some success predicting the
lifetimes of various phenomena.
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II. POSSIBLE VS. EXISTING
A. God’s Coin Toss
The crux of the matter can be described by a “God’s Coin Toss” experiment [3,6].
Suppose that God tosses a fair coin. If it comes up heads, he creates ten people, each in
their own room. If tails, he creates one thousand people, each in their own room. The rooms
are numbered 1-10 or 1-1000. The people cannot see or communicate with the other rooms.
Suppose that you know all this, and you discover that you are in one of the first ten rooms.
How should you reason that the coin fell?
Leslie and Bostrom argue as follows. Before you look at your room number, you should
think that since the coin was fair the chance of heads was 1/2. Now if the coin was heads,
then of course you would be in one of the first ten rooms. However, if the coin was tails, the
chance to be in one of the first ten rooms is 1/100. Thus, according to Eq. (2), you should
now believe that the coin was heads with probability 0.99.
The alternative argument runs as follows. Before you look at your room number, you
should think that the probability of heads is 0.99. There are one thousand possible people
who would be right with that belief, whereas only ten would be right with the belief in
heads. When you look at your room number, you should then update your probabilities
using Eq. (2). The result is that in the end you think the chance is 1/2 that the coin was
heads. Another way to say the same thing is that there are ten ways to have the coin heads
and you in a room in the first ten, and ten ways to have the coin tails and you in a room in
the first ten, and thus the chances for heads and tails are equal.
The difference here hinges on whether one considers possible people in the same ways
that one considers actual people. If instead of flipping a coin, God creates both sets of
rooms, then Leslie and Bostrom and I all agree that you should think it much more probable
that you are in the large set before you look at your room number, and equally probable
afterward. Treating the two possibilities in the same way as two sets of actual observers
implies the Self-Indication Assumption: the existence of a large number of observers in a
possible universe increases the chance to find oneself in that universe.
I will argue below that the equal treatment of possible and actual observers is correct.
B. Improving the experiment
It is possible to produce modified versions of this thought experiment which will avoid any
disagreement, as follows.2 Imagine that you are one of a very large number of experimental
subjects who have been gathered, in case of need, into an experimental pool. Each subject is
in a separate waiting room and cannot communicate with the others. First the experiment
will be described to you, and then it will be performed. The experiment will have one of
the following two designs.
2 Similar thought experiments have been discussed by Bartha and Hitchcock [10] and by Bostrom
[6].
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Protocol 1 (random) The experimenter will flip a fair coin. If the coin lands heads, she
will get ten subjects, chosen randomly from the pool, and put them in rooms numbered 1-10.
If the coin lands tails, she will do the same with one thousand subjects in rooms numbered
1-1000.
Protocol 2 (guaranteed) The experimenter will flip a fair coin. If the coin lands heads,
she will get you and nine other subjects, and put you randomly into rooms numbered 1-10.
If the coin lands tails, she will get you and 999 other subjects and put you randomly into
rooms numbered 1-1000.
How should you rate the probability of the outcomes of the coin flip, before and after
learning that your room number is in the first ten? I think we can all agree that in protocol
1, before looking at your room number you should expect that the coin was tails with
probability 0.99, because it is 100 times more likely in that case that you would have been
chosen for the experiment at all. Then when you have learned your room number, you
should think that the chance of heads was 1/2.
In protocol 2, since you knew that you would participate, you don’t learn anything more
when the experiment begins, so you should think the chance of heads was 1/2. After learning
that you are in one of the first ten rooms, you should think that the chance for heads is now
0.99, in accordance with Eq. (2).
The question, then, is which of these scenarios is like the God’s Coin Toss experiment.
If God’s Coin Toss is like protocol 1, then the chance of there being many people in this
case is equal to the chance of there being few, and the Doomsday Argument is wrong. If
God’s Coin Toss is like protocol 2, then it is much more likely that there are few people,
and the Doomsday Argument is correct. I believe that it is the first case, and thus the
Doomsday Argument is wrong. The following section gives several arguments in support of
this position.
III. ARGUMENTS
A. Asymmetry
Protocol 1 is symmetrical with respect to all participants. That is, each person sitting
in their room, before looking at the number, can reason the same way. Protocol 2, however,
does not have this property. You, as one of the originally chosen subjects, can reason as
above. However, at most 9 other people can reason in this way. If there are one thousand
subjects, the rest of them must have started with different initial information. The God’s
Coin Toss example is symmetrical with respect to all participants, and so is like protocol 1.
Note that it does not help to argue that you exist, and thus that you must be one of those
chosen for the experiment. This is merely like observing, as you sit in your numbered room,
that you have been chosen to participate. It applies equally in the case of protocol 1, and
does not change the argument there. To claim that the God’s coin toss (or the real world)
is like protocol 2, you have to claim not only that you exist but that you exist necessarily,
i.e., that God was required to choose you as one of the people to create, regardless of the
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outcome of the coin flip. You must also think that in case the coin landed tails, there would
be lots of other people who were created but whose creation was not necessary.
B. Discontinuity
The Leslie-Bostrom analysis of God’s Coin Toss has a strange discontinuity in the way
in which your judgment of the chance of heads depends on the number of people created in
that case. Consider the set of cases where on tails God creates 1010 people, and on heads
he creates some number N between 0 and 1010, and the particular value of N is known to
you. If N = 0, then you can say with certainty that the coin fell tails, because otherwise
you would not exist. If we treat the N and the 1010 possible people the same way we would
treat actual groups of people, then the probability we assign to heads smoothly approaches
0 as N → 0. But by Leslie and Bostrom’s analysis, this probability is always 1/2 as long as
N ≥ 1, but drops suddenly to 0 when N = 0.
C. Dependence on the nature of probability
There are different kinds of probability. One kind is based on ignorance, such as the
case of the coin which has already been flipped but not yet examined. A similar kind of
probability is the case of an event which has already been determined, but not yet occurred,
and whose occurrence is too complicated to compute. An example is the falling of the ball
into a slot on a roulette wheel after you make a last-minute bet (but see [11]). Another
example is the pseudo-random numbers generated by a computer. In the deterministic
Newtonian worldview, all probabilities are of one of these types.
In contrast to this view, one can have classical indeterminism, in which outcomes of
(some) events are determined truly by chance. One can also have quantum mechanical
indeterminism, but that depends on one’s interpretation of quantum mechanics. In the in-
terpretation which just takes the wave function as fundamental with no collapse process,
there is no indeterminism. There is also no indeterminism in the multiple worlds interpre-
tation.
The multiple worlds interpretation is particularly problematic here. If one imagines that
God’s Coin Toss is really a quantum mechanical event, then in the literal multiple worlds
interpretation, there are two sets of actually existing observers, one in ten rooms and one
in a thousand rooms. In such a case, advocates of the doomsday argument agree that it
does not apply. The claim that the likelihood of disaster depends on the interpretation of
quantum mechanics is a strange one, since physical processes (such as those that might lead
to destruction) should not depend on a choice of quantum mechanics interpretations.
D. Dependence on the content of causally disconnected regions
At least as argued by Bostrom [6, page 123], the doomsday argument depends on whether
or not we are the only intelligent species in the universe. He claims that if there are lots of
extraterrestrial civilizations, of varying duration, then we should expect to find ourselves in
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one of the long-lived civilizations, thus canceling the doomsday argument. This means that
how one should estimate one’s future prospects depends on the existence of extraterrestrials,
even if they are in causally-disconnected regions of the universe. Again, this is very strange,
because one would think that conditions in places that can have no communication with us
should not affect our future.
E. Reference class problems
The reference class is the set of all observers, which one needs (explicitly or implicitly) in
order to say things like “one expects to find oneself randomly situated among all observers”.
There are many problems concerning the definition of this class. However, there is a special
problem related to different treatment of possible and actual observers. Suppose that you
know that God created one set of ten rooms with ten humans and another set of a thousand
rooms with humans in the first ten and chimpanzees in the remainder. Finding yourself a
human in one of rooms 1-10, you can conclude that it is equally likely that you are in the
set of just ten or the first ten in the thousand. In this case, it is not necessary to discuss the
mental capacities of chimpanzees.
But now suppose that God flips the coin and creates either just the ten humans (if
heads), or the ten humans and 990 chimpanzees (if tails). I would argue that finding
yourself a human in one of rooms 1-10, you should conclude that the chance that the coin
fell heads is 1/2. But if you believe the analysis of Leslie and Bostrom [6, page 77], then the
result depends crucially on whether you could have been a chimpanzee. If chimpanzees are
in the reference class, then the argument is the same as the original God’s Coin Toss, and
it is nearly certain that the coin fell heads. On the other hand, if chimpanzees are excluded
from the reference class, perhaps because they can’t understand philosophical arguments,
then you are necessarily in one of rooms 1-10, and so the chance of heads is still 1/2. Thus
the different treatment of possible observers has led to a situation where you need to know
something about the intellectual capacity of chimpanzees, even though you already know you
aren’t one.
F. Unreasonable predictive powers
Although it may seem to beg the question, one can argue that the existence of the
doomsday argument may itself be a reason not to believe that possible and actual observers
should be treated differently. The point is not the undesirability of the doomsday conclusion,
but rather that it does not seem that one should be able to infer such conclusions about
the future by looking only at the past. The probability of a disaster should be just the
probability that it will occur given the pre-existing conditions.
One might imagine the case of a gambler who is about to throw a set of fair dice. If she
wins she will spend her winnings on some action that will increase the eventual number of
people, such as the funding of space colonies. Should she then think that her chance for the
dice to fall favorably is reduced below the normal statistical probability?
This problem can be further strengthened, as follows.
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G. Paranormal and backward causation
Bostrom [6, chapter 8] points out that if one accepts the doomsday argument one must
also accept a number of very strange similar arguments. For example, suppose that there
is some kind of a natural happening that we have no control over but nevertheless wish to
avert. For example, suppose that we learn that a nearby star has a 90% chance of becoming
a supernova, causing significant destruction on earth but not killing everyone. Now we make
the plan (and make sure that it will be carried out) that if the supernova occurs we will
start an aggressive program of space colonization, leading to a huge increase in the number
of people that will eventually exist, while otherwise we will not. Now the same doomsday
argument that says that the human race is likely to end soon tells us that the supernova is
not likely to occur. If it did occur, we would then be in the first tiny fraction of humanity.
Not only does this seem to allow us to affect things over which we should not be able
to have any control, but it even works backward in time. By exactly the same argument,
even if the supernova has or has not already occurred in the past, and its effects have not
reached us, we can change the chance of its having occurred by the above procedure.
Obviously this kind of paranormal and backward causation is ridiculous. Bostrom says
that it is not as bad as it seems, but to do so he has to resort to some rather strange
argumentation including the claim that given some action A and some consequence C, one
can consistently believe “If we do A then we will have brought about C” and “If we don’t
do A then the counterfactual ’Had we done A then C would have occurred’ is false”. It
would seem easier just to say that the type of argumentation that gives us these paranormal
powers, and thus the Doomsday Argument as well, is simply incorrect.
We can perhaps understand this situation better by trying to construct it using the
experimental protocols above. In the random assignment case, there is no problem. We get
Protocol 3 (random assignment, late decision) The experimenter will first choose ten
subjects randomly and put them in rooms 1-10. Subject #10 will then get to flip a coin and
call the outcome. If he is correct, the experiment is over. If not, the experimenter will choose
subjects randomly to fill the rest of the thousand rooms.
Does this give subject #10 any special ability to influence the coin flip? No, because of
the reasoning above with respect to protocol 1. Finding yourself in the first 10 rooms in this
case gives you no special information about the coin flip.
To produce an analogy where the supernova argument would work is very tricky. In the
case where the coin is indeterministic, it cannot be done. The experimenter must first fill
rooms 1-10 without knowing the flip outcome. Thus she doesn’t know whether to put you
(the privileged observer) into one of these rooms or not, so she cannot create situation where
you have an equal chance of being in any of the thousand rooms, in the case of incorrect
prediction. I suspect that this issue is at the heart of Leslie’s [3] claim that the doomsday
argument depends on the nonexistence of “radical indeterminism”.
In the case where there is determinism, then perhaps the experimenter can arrange the
experiment as desired by advance knowledge of how the coin will fall and how subject #10
will call it, giving
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Protocol 4 (guarantee, late decision) The experimenter will choose ten subjects and
put them in rooms 1-10. Subject #10 will then flip a coin and call the outcome. If he
will be correct, then the experimenter will make you one of the first ten subjects at random.
If subject #10 will be incorrect, then the experimenter will fill the remainder of the thousand
rooms, and will assign you to one of the entire thousand rooms at random.
Now can you infer that subject #10 has special powers to predict the coin flip? Indeed
you can. Your chance to have been in one of the first 10 rooms is very small if he’s going
to call it wrong, while it is guaranteed if he’s going to call it right. On the other hand, one
can see that this is really just that the experimenter has given you some special knowledge
about the outcome of her amazing predictive abilities. Furthermore, she cannot have given
this information to everyone, because all “guarantee” protocols treat some of the observer
specially. I don’t think the real world where we are trying to avert some disaster has much
in common with this model.
H. Nonrepeatability
Suppose that God flips his coin many times and creates many batches of people, some
in sets of ten and some in sets of a thousand. Then even Leslie’s argument doesn’t yield a
doomsday prediction. All sequences of coin flips are equally probable, in this interpretation,
but the great majority of the time there are many small sets and many large sets. Thus
before looking at your room number, you expect to be in a large set. After finding that you
are in the first ten, you now reduce your estimate of the coin flip relevant to you to nearly
equal probabilities of heads and tails. The same result could be seen in a repeated version
of the “guarantee” protocol in which the experiment is done many times and the guarantee
is that you will be one of the subjects in one of the runs, with equal probability to be any
one of those subjects.
Thus Leslie’s argumentation depends on there being only a single universe. He agrees
with this and says “In cases like this we must reject the intuition. . . that to estimate prob-
abilities we ought to ask what bets would maximize winnings when the experiment was
repeated infinitely many times” [3, page 228]. This does not seem to bother Leslie, but it is
a strange claim. In some theories of probability, probability just means the bet that would
maximize winnings, but even if one doesn’t accept this as a definition, it still seems clear
there is something wrong with a system for computing probabilities that yields odds vastly
different from how a bettor should bet.
IV. GOTT’S ANALYSIS
A. Problems
Gott’s argument, discussed in the introduction, suffers from two important errors pointed
out in a letter by Buch [12]. They are discussed in detail by Caves [13] and by Bostrom
[6], so I cover them somewhat quickly here. First of all, Gott [4] makes a simple omission:
he does not include the prior probabilities for the various lifetimes. Gott corrected this
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omission in [14] and [15] by saying that we should start with the “vague Bayesian prior” or
“Jeffreys prior” [16],
Pprior(T ) ∝ T
−1 . (8)
This means that the chance for T to be in any logarithmic interval is the same.
Once we have the prior probability, Gott claims we can determine the probability for
various lifetimes according to Bayes’s Rule as
P (T |tpast) ∝ P (tpast|T )Pprior(T ) . (9)
Here P (tpast|T ) is the chance to measure tpast given that the actual lifetime is T , which is
P (tpast|T ) =
{
1/T if tpast < T
0 otherwise.
(10)
Putting Eqs. (8) and (10) into Eq. (9) gives
P (T |tpast) ∝ 1/T
−2 if T > tpast (11)
which reproduces Gott’s predictions.
Unfortunately, there are still two problems. The first is that Gott’s prior is not reasonable
for any ordinary phenomenon. For one thing, it cannot be normalized, and even if one doesn’t
consider this a technical difficulty, it means that the chance of T being in any given finite
interval is zero. Even if we adopt Gott’s suggestion to establish cutoffs at some tiny and
some huge lifetime (e.g., [14] recommends the upper limit 105,000,000 years), the prior chance
of any reasonably sized interval is infinitesimal. For example, Gott applied his principle to
the Berlin Wall, built in 1961 and observed by Gott in 1969. Would it be reasonable to use
the “vague prior” here? To check this we can ask what would be a reasonable expectation
for the lifetime of the wall at the time that it was built, and thus when no “past lifetime”
information was available. How would you have estimated the chance that it would last
more than a year and less than 100 years? More than a year and less than 100,000 years?
If you think that either chance is nonzero, then you don’t believe in the vague prior. (In
the case with the cutoff, there would be 5,000,000 factors of 10 in the range of possible
durations, so the chance to be between 1 and 105 years is 10−6.)
The second problem [12,13] is that Gott has neglected the fact that a long-lived phe-
nomenon is more likely to be presently ongoing, and thus to be observed, than one which
is short-lived. Thus if Pprior(T ) is the probability that a phenomenon of the class under
consideration chosen randomly from among all such phenomenon ever to exist has lifetime
T , then the probability that a phenomenon chosen from all those currently existing has this
lifetime is
Pcurrently existing(T ) ∝ TPprior(T ) . (12)
Following [12], we call this the anthropic factor. Its effect is to cancel the factor due to
P (tpast|T ) to give
P (T |tpast) ∝
{
Pprior(T ) if T > tpast
0 otherwise.
(13)
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Thus we do not learn anything new from knowing the past lifetime, other than that the total
lifetime must be at least as large as what we have observed. Our judgment of the longevity
of the phenomenon is still what we get from the prior probability, i.e. from our analysis of
other information we may have about its lifetime.
The anthropic factor of Eq. (12) is very much like the argument of previous sections that
an observer is more likely to observe a world with many observers than one with few, and
the cancelation that leads to Eq. (13) is very much like the cancelation that leads to Eq.
(7). In both cases, when one takes the relevant principle into account, one finds that the
conditional probability based on one’s observations is just the prior probability.
However, in the present case there is no need to resort to complex argumentation to
justify the use of Eq. (12). For a simple example, we can consider the case of radioactive
decay [12], where the prior is known. Consider nuclei of some radioactive element with
lifetime τ . Each such nucleus will live for sometime T after the time at which it is created,
and the distribution of T is
Pprior(T ) ∝ e
−T/τ . (14)
Now suppose that we find such a nucleus lying about our laboratory, and somehow we’re
able to trace its history and learn its tpast. Now by Gott’s argument, we should think that
its total lifetime is distributed as
P (T ) ∝
1
T
e−T/τ if T > tpast , (15)
which is not correct. Including the anthropic factor gives the correct answer
P (T ) ∝ e−T/τ if T > tpast . (16)
Thus in an elementary case, we see that it is correct to include the extra factor, and thus
that no “extra” information can be derived from considering the past lifetime.
B. Successes
Gott made many predictions by applying his principle, and many of them appeared to be
confirmed. If his principle was wrong, why did his predictions turn out so well? One reason
is that using an unreasonable prior probability and not including the anthropic factor cancel
each other to some degree. It’s hard to know what would be a reasonable prior probability
for examples like the Berlin Wall, but Gott also studied the lifetimes of Broadway and off-
Broadway plays and musicals, and in this case we have a large dataset and can do statistics.
I analyzed all the Broadway shows listed in the Internet Theatre Database
(www.theatredb.com) that opened between 6/1/70 and 5/30/90 to determine their run-
ning time.3 The data are shown in Fig. 1. The data points are the percentage of shows
3I didn’t include off-Broadway shows, because they were not uniformly listed in this database,
and I didn’t include any after 1990, in order to give them time to close. I only listed shows that
had closed and whose opening and closing dates were recorded in this database. About 5% of the
shows did not have this data, but they did not seem to be a biased set.
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FIG. 1. Percentage of shows with running times more than or equal to the beginning of each
interval and less than the end. The dashed line is a power-law fit to the data points after the peak,
P = 390T−0.7.
whose running time (number of days counting both opening and closing days) is within the
given number of days. Thus the first data point is the number of shows running only one
day, the next is those running two or three days, and so on.
It is clear from Fig. 1 that the actual distribution does not fit Gott’s prior very well at
all. The “vague prior”, Eq. (8), would give equal numbers of events in each interval, and
thus a flat distribution in Fig. 1. Instead, there is a peak around 50–100 days, and a sharp
decline after that.
However, for durations after the peak, and excluding a few very long duration shows, the
number of shows in a logarithmic interval is well fit by the curve Pprior(T )dT ∝ T
−0.7d lnT ∝
T−1.7dT , shown by the dashed line in Fig. 1. This is close to Pprior(T ) ∝ T
−2, which yields
Eq. (11) once one properly takes account of the anthropic factor, and thus reproduces Gott’s
calculations [13]. This explains some of Gott’s successes in predicting the longevity of long-
lived shows.
What about shows with short tpast? It’s clear that Gott underpredicts their duration.
For example, Gott gives a show which has been open 44 days a 97.5% chance of closing
within 4× 39 = 156 days, but from the 20 years of data described above, this chance is only
78%. However, very few of Gott’s sample had been showing for such low periods of time, so
the number of opportunities for him to make such an error was small.
What about the future of humanity? Gott claims that since Npast ∼ 7 × 10
10 people
have been born so far, the number of humans yet to be born is between 1.8 × 109 and
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2.7×1012, and thus the current birthrate is unlikely to continue for more than 19,000 years.4
This argument, however, neglects the “anthropic” factor, and uses the “vague prior”. If
we do the calculation correctly, we just reproduce the prior probability, and so the issue is
to make our best estimation of our probable survival. One could debate this estimate at
length, but it is clear that it is not the “vague prior”, since there is obviously some chance
of our species perishing in the near future. In fact, it seems that the previous lifetime of our
species is essentially irrelevant to many of the possible causes of our destruction. It doesn’t
really matter how long it took and how many people lived and died before we achieved the
technology to destroy ourselves. The danger is at the present time when we have the ability
to destroy our species but lack good safeguards that would prevent us from doing so.
Moreover, it seems as though a sensible estimation of our chances is bimodal. There
is a nonzero chance that we will become extinct or lose our technological abilities in the
relatively near future. But if this does not happen, if it is likely that we will colonize the
galaxy, and then our chances of surviving a very long time are quite high. Thus a sensible
distribution for the lifetime of humanity or the number of people who will ever be born is
not smooth or monotonic.
V. COUNTERARGUMENTS
A. Confirming evidence
Leslie [3, page 226] gives the following example about the probability of theories that
yield different numbers of observers. Marochnik [17] suggested a theory in which planets
(and thus observers) occur only around stars near corotation (the distance from the center
of the galaxy at which the individual stars orbit with the angular velocity of the spiral arm
pattern). Suppose (to strengthen the argument) that this suggestion was made before our
Sun’s position was known, and then it was discovered that it was quite close to corotation.
Surely this should be viewed as important support for Marochnik’s theory.
On the other hand, Leslie argues, if we give greater probability to universes with more
observers (the “Self-Indication Assumption” — SIA), the chance of being here at corotation
is no larger in this theory than in one in which planets were common throughout the galaxy.
Thus the theory that planets are everywhere and the theory that planets are only here give
the same probability for us to be where we are. It appears that in fact the evidence does
not lead us to prefer the Marochnik theory. Leslie rejects this consequence and claims that
it shows that SIA is wrong.
What has happened here? Is it really true that accepting SIA means that we have no
support for Marochnik’s theory, even though it has successfully predicted our position in the
galaxy? That’s not quite right. However you look at it, you should agree that you have a
much better reason to believe this theory after the observation than before. The issue is how
likely this theory was in advance of observation. If you feel that in advance of observation,
4This argument is more pessimistic than that of the introduction, because it considers the number
of people rather than the duration of civilization in years.
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the theory was wildly unlikely, then you can feel even though the evidence has made it much
more likely, that it is still not an especially well-supported theory. The reason to feel that it
is a priori unlikely, of course, is that it leads to a very small number of observers, as opposed
to the theory in which planets are common everywhere. (You could also feel that this theory
is unlikely, in advance of observation, because of the possibility that it will immediately be
ruled out by finding that we are in a place where no planets should have been.)
Let’s consider instead, for a moment, a problem about different galaxies instead of dif-
ferent theories. Suppose that some galaxies have planets around every star, while others
have planets only in a special place. Once we have learned this, we should think it highly
likely that our galaxy is one with planets everywhere. However when we later find that we
ourselves live in the special place where all galaxies have planets, then we should feel no
preference about which type of galaxy we have. It would not be right to say that it’s more
likely that we are in a few-planet galaxy because that would “explain” or “correctly predict”
our position in our galaxy. Half the planets in our position are in few-planet galaxies, so we
should think the chance that we are one of those is 1/2.
Now consider an intermediate case where the number of planets depends on some other
parameter of cosmology. For example, consider a situation where you think that the hot
dark matter (HDM) and cold dark matter (CDM) theories of cosmology are equally likely.
Then suppose you find out that CDM would lead to planets around every star, while HDM
would lead to planets only in a special place.5 At this point, I think you should consider
the CDM theory much more likely to be correct, because it predicts many observers, while
the HDM theory predicts few. If now you find that we are in fact in the special place where
both theories predict planets, you should return to thinking that the two theories are equally
likely, just as in the previous case. The number of civilizations finding themselves in the
position which we find ourselves is the same in the two theories, so we have no reason to
prefer one over the other.
Now let us return to the Marochnik case. Suppose that before considering the effect
on the number of observers or measuring our position in the galaxy you think that the
Marochnik theory and the planets-everywhere theory are equally credible. Then, I claim,
when you take account of the differing number of observers, you should think that the
planets-everywhere theory is far more likely, and when you find our position in the galaxy is
as Marochnik predicted, you should go back to finding the theories equally likely. I realize
that it is quite counterintuitive that one should not believe this theory when it has made a
correct prediction, but I think the situation is as in the model above, where the idea that
we are in a few-planet galaxy correctly “predicts” our location, but that does not make it
more probable that we are in fact in the few-planet galaxy.6
5This is not supposed to be a real astrophysical theory, but just an example to probe our reasoning
about the credibility of theories.
6This raises the question of why we don’t in fact find ourselves in a galaxy teeming with intelligent
species. One possibility is that other factors such as the amount of expansion of the universe during
inflation have dominated factors involving the number of intelligent species per galaxy [7].
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B. Bostrom’s “presumptuous philosopher”
Bostrom [6, page 134] gives a related example. Suppose that we are certain that one of
two cosmological theories is correct, but don’t have a strong preference between them. Both
predict finite universes with contents similar to ours, but one theory predicts a universe a
trillion times larger than the other. Physicists would like to do an experiment which will
determine which theory is the correct one, but the “presumptuous philosopher” explains
that this is unnecessary. Since one theory has a trillion times more observers than the other,
we already know that that theory is a trillion times more likely.
Is this in fact an argument against the Self-Indication Assumption, or should we just
accept that the presumptuous philosopher is correct? As above, we can consider the case
of a single agreed-upon theory that includes a large number of universes, some a trillion
times larger than others, and we wanted to know which type of universe we were in. Then
the presumptuous philosopher would be right that the chance of being in a small universe
is infinitesimal. It seems to me that, from the arguments of this paper, the presumptuous
philosopher is also correct in the original scenario, as long as we feel that the likelihoods of
the two theories are roughly equal before one considers the effect on the number of observers.
However, one should give at least some consideration to the idea that a theory which
involves a very large number is less likely to be correct than one which does not. For
example, suppose I have a crazy theory that each planet actually has 1010
100
copies of itself
on “other planes”. Suppose that I (as cranks often do) believe this theory in spite of the
fact that every reputable scientist thinks it is garbage. I could argue that my theory is
very likely to be correct, because the chance that every reputable scientist is independently
wrong is clearly more than 1 in 1010
100
. To avoid this conclusion, one must say that the a
priori chance that my theory was right was less than 1 in 1010
100
. It seems hard to have such
fantastic confidence that a theory is wrong, but if we don’t allow that we will be prey to the
argument above.
One might say that this really just shows the strange consequences of accepting SIA.
However, similar scenarios exist without any dependence on the number of observers. For
example, suppose a stranger comes up to you with the claim that if you give him a dollar
today he will give you $10 tomorrow. Presumably you won’t give him the dollar, which shows
(if you are maximizing your expectation) that you think the chance he will come through as
he says is less than 10%. On the other hand, it would be strange to claim that the chance
is less than one in a million, since sometimes people making statements like this are honest.
At this level you might even consider the possibility that your whole understanding of the
world has one chance in a million to be very wrong, and so you can’t trust your expectation
that you won’t be paid to this level. Nevertheless, if the payoff is raised to $10 million, you
still won’t give the dollar, which shows that now you think the chance for a payback is in
fact less than 1 in 10 million. In order to not have a proposed payback large enough to
deprive you of your money, you must think that the likelihood of getting paid decreases at
least inversely with the proposed payback.
Applying this to cosmology, it is possible that one should think that a theory involving
a very large universe is unlikely in proportion to the size of the universe it proposes. In this
case, the presumptuous philosopher is wrong, because the tiny a priori probability for the
theory with the larger universe cancels its larger number of observers. The theories must
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then compete on their merits.
VI. QUANTUM COSMOLOGY
A theory of quantum cosmology gives an initial wave function for the universe (although
there is disagreement about what this wave function should be [18,19]). Quantum mechanical
evolution should then take the initial wave function and evolve it up to the present time.
The result will be a huge superposition of possible outcomes. From this wave function we
need to determine what we should expect to observe. Presumably, most sectors of this wave
function will describe conditions not suited to the existence of observers, so we must take
into account anthropic considerations [7].
With the treatment that I have advocated here, the procedure is straightforward. We look
at all observers existing in all sectors of the wave function, and assume that we are randomly
situated among all those observers, with probabilities given by the squared magnitudes of
the coefficients in the wave function. This gives us the probability distribution for what we
should expect to observe. If we have already made some observations, and wish to predict the
outcome of others, then we should simply discard all observers whose observations conflict
with what we have seen and consider the distribution among those observers remaining.
On the other hand, if we follow Leslie and Bostrom’s analysis, then we will have the
problem of section IIIC above, and our conclusions will depend on our interpretation of
quantum mechanics. If we use the Copenhagen interpretation, then sectors of the wave
function should be interpreted as classical probabilistic alternatives. Then, if we follow
Leslie and Bostrom, we should expect that we are typical observers in a typical sector of
the wave function, which is not the same thing as the above. Sectors with small numbers of
observers are overrepresented in this procedure. If, on the other hand, we use the multiple
worlds interpretation, then all possible observers actually exist, and we should find ourselves
to be typical among them. The fact that Leslie and Bostrom’s treatment yields ambiguous
predictions argues against its use in evaluating theories of quantum cosmology.
VII. CONCLUSION
When you learn new information, you should update the probabilities you assign to
various hypotheses, based on the new information. You should now favor hypotheses that
made the new data seem likely over those that made it seem unusual. Thus whatever chance
you assign to the possibility that the human race will end fairly shortly, you should increase
it when you take into account the position in which you find yourself. Knowing that you
are among the first 70 billion people to exist gives you reason to prefer theories in which the
total number of people ever to exist is not much larger than 70 billion. This is the Doomsday
Argument [1,3,6].
On the other hand, I have argued here that when you take into account the fact that you
exist at all, you should update your probabilities in precisely the inverse manner, finding it
more likely to be in a race with a larger total number of individuals. This effect follows if
one considers the case where there might be a large number or might be a small number of
people as analogous to the case where there are a large number of people of one kind and a
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small number of another. This effect exactly cancels the effect of taking into account your
position in the species.
The result of including both these effects is the same as the result of including neither.
You judge the probability of early doom to be whatever you judge it to be from considering
the actual processes that might put an end to humanity. You get no other information from
arguments about your existence and when you were born. This agrees with our intuition
that the chance of an event (e.g., the earth being hit by an asteroid) should not depend on
the event’s consequences (e.g., humanity being wiped out).
In the case of Gott’s argument, the situation is clear. One must include the fact that
longer-lived phenomena are more likely to be currently ongoing to get sensible predictions
[12,13]. Once one does so, Gott’s argument does not change the prior probability distribution
for the longevity of a phenomenon.
In the case of the Carter-Leslie argument, the situation is not as clear as that. However,
I have given a number of arguments that we should in fact treat universes with longer-lived
human races as more likely for that reason, until we take account of our position in the
species. With this effect included, there is no force in the Doomsday Argument.
Nevertheless, I would not want anyone to become unconcerned with the future of hu-
manity as a result of the present paper. Serious dangers do face us, and we should work to
minimize them, even if they are no larger than one would at first think.
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